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Rethinking Established Section 10(b) Doctrines
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial interpretation of the federal securities laws has undergone a
fundamental shift in the past two decades. Prior to 1976, the courts expansively
interpreted the securities laws, regularly implying extrastatutory causes of actions
to effectuate broad-based remedial purposes.' In 1976 with the seminal case,
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,2 the United States Supreme Court began a new era
of restrictive interpretation of the federal securities laws. Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver represents a continuation of this trend
and suggests future judicial retrenchment of the securities laws is likely.
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held a private plaintiff may not
maintain an aiding and abetting4 action under Section 10(b)5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19346 (hereinafter "the 1934 Act" or "the Act") and Securities
Copyright 1995. by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. See Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1934. 69 Calif. L. Rev. 80, 82 (1981) for a discussion of the "wholesale incorporation of ...
common law doctrines into the federal securities laws."
2. 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
3. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
4. Aiding and abetting is a tenet of the criminal law. Traditionally, an aider and abettor is
"[olne who assists another in the accomplishment of a common design or purpose; he must be aware
of, and consent to. such design or purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 68 (6th ed. 1990). In the
context of securities laws, aiding and abetting is a nebulous term, describing a person who lends
some degree of aid to one who himself, directly or indirectly, engages in a proscribed conduct.
Private aiding and abetting liability was first recognized under the general antifraud provision, Section
10(b), of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988), in Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676 (1966). See infra part III.A.2.
Prior to Central Bank, a significant percentage of all cases prosecuted under Section 10(b) were
brought against lawyers, banks, accountants, trustees, directors, and other secondary parties on the
theory of aiding and abetting. Fischel, supra note i, at 82. Such parties were considered aiders and
abettors, rather than primary violators, because their involvement in the proscribed conduct was only
peripheral; i.e. they did not themselves engage in each of the elements necessary to show a primary
violation. Central Batik expressly rejects civil aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b).
5. Section 10(b) is the general antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities Exchange] Commission may prescribe ....
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). Although Section 10(b) provides no civil remedies, a private Section 10(b)
action has been implied by the courts and is now well established. See infra part ilI.A.I.
6. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1988), governs the operation
of stock exchange and over-the-counter markets. The 1934 Act was enacted to provide for regulation
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and Exchange Commission (hereinafter "the SEC" or "the Commission") Rule
lOb-5.' This decision resolved an issue expressly reserved by the Court on two
prior occasions,. concerning the proscriptive scope of the judicially implied
private Section 10(b) cause of action. Prior to Central Bank, eleven federal
courts of appeals recognized an extrastatutory private action for aiding and
abetting under Section 10(b). 9 Emphasizing the primacy of the statute, the Court
in Central Bank concluded "nothing in the text or history of (Section] 10(b) even
implies that aiding and abetting was covered by the statutory prohibition on
manipulative and deceptive conduct."' °
Since 1976, the Supreme Court has consistently acted to narrow the scope
of the implied Section 10(b) private action. The Court's holding in Central Bank
follows this trend. The Court's reasoning in these decisions, however, has been
inconsistent. In one line of cases, the Court has espoused a preference for strict
and control of the securities markets and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such
transactions. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1921-22
(1975).
7. Rule lOb-5, the operative regulation enacted by the SEC in 1942 pursuant to Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would.operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
8. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), the Court expressly
reserved the issue of Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability:
In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud is required for
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we need not consider whether civil liability
for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule, nor the elements
necessary to establish such a cause of action.
Id. at 191-92 n.7, 96 S. Ct. at 1380 n.7. And, in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
163 S. Ct. 683 (1983), the Court noted, "While several Courts of Appeals have permitted aider-and-
abettor liability, we specifically reserved this issue in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder." Id. at 379 n.5,
103 S. Ct. at 685 n.5 (1983) (citations omitted).
9. See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992); K &
S Partnership v. Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1991); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950
F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991); Fine v. American
Solar King Corp.. 919 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1990); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.
1989); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477 (11 th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. Frost, 483 U.S. 1006, 107 S. Ct. 3231 (1987); Cleary
v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (Ist Cir, 1983); lIT v, Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980);
Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co.. 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978).
10. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1451 (1994).
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adherence to the statutory language in interpreting Section 10(b)." In another
line of cases (concerning insider tradingt2), the Court has turned to common-law
doctrines to resolve Section 10(b) issues.' 3 Central Bank represents the Court's
reassertion of strict statutory construction as the preferred means of interpreting
Section 10(b). Despite overwhelming appellate and district court precedent to
the contrary, the Supreme Court in Central Bank rejected Section 10(b) aiding
and abetting liability. In light of the "potential far-reaching effects of Central
Bank,"' 4 many extrastatutory Section 10(b) doctrines are now subject to attack.
II. THE CENTRAL BANK DECISION
The Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank has been called "a watershed
in the development of the federalsecurities laws."' 3  The Court held a private
plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting action under Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed the language of
Section 10(b), the statutory framework of the 1934 Act, and the relevant
legislative history. This Part will consider the case history, the rationale
underlying the Court's decision, and the likely effect the decision will have on
subsequent interpretations of the securities laws.
A. The Case History
Petitioner, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. ("Central Bank"), served as
indenture trustee 6 for bonds issued in 1986 and 1988 by the Colorado Springs-
Stetson Hills Public Building Authority ("the Authority"). The bonds were
issued to finance a planned residential and commercial development in Colorado
Springs and were secured by landowner assessment liens covering 500 acres of
the proposed development. The bond covenants required AmWest Development
("AmWest"), the developer of the Stetson Hills project, to submit to Central
Bank an annual appraisal of the lands securing the bonds. The covenants further
11. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ci. 1375 (1976).
12. See infra note 139.
13. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
14. John F. Olson et al., The End of Section 10(b) Aiding and Abetting Liability Fiction, Inside
Litig. (F-H), May 1994, at 21.
15. Jonathan Eisenberg, Supreme Court Overturns Aiding and Abeting Liability, C938 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 581, 583 (1994).
16. In business financing, bonds and debentures are issued tinder indentures-written
agreements "setting forth form of bond, maturity date, amount of issue, description of pledged assets,
interest rate, and other terms," entered into between the issuing corporation and an indenture trustee.
An indenture trustee is a "person or institution," typically a commercial bank, who is charged with
carrying out the terms of the indenture and, in the cases of bonds, with holding legal title to corporate
property serving as security for the issue. Black's Law Dictionary 770 (6th ed. 1990).
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stipulated that the land subject to the liens must be worth at least 160% of the
bonds' outstanding value ("the 160% test").
Pursuant to the bond covenant, AmWest provided Central Bank with an
appraisal of the land in January of 1988. Despite a significant downturn in
property values, the appraisal indicated the land's value was essentially
unchanged from the previous appraisals. Soon thereafter, Central Bank was
contacted by the senior underwriter of the 1986 bond issue, who expressed
concern that the 160% test was not being met. Central Bank consulted its in-
house appraiser who agreed the appraisal was optimistic and recommended the
bank retain an outside consultant to review it. For unexplained reasons, Central
Bank decided to delay independent review of the appraisal until the end of the
year-more than six months after the planned closing for the 1988 bond issue.
Before the independent appraisal was conducted and after the closing of the 1988.
bond issue, the Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds. 7
Respondents, First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. and Jack Naber,
purchasers of $2.1 million worth of the 1988 bonds, sued the Authority, the 1988
underwriter, a director of AmWest, and Central Bank alleging violations of
Section 10(b). The complaint alleged that the Authority, the underwriter, and the
director had made fraudulent misrepresentations in the official statement for the
1988 bond issue concerning the accuracy of the appraisal. The complaint further
alleged that Central Bank was "secondarily liable under [Section] 10(b) for its
conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud."'"
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted Central
Bank's motion for summary judgment (decisions not reported). The respondents
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Reversing,
the court identified the following to be the elements of the Section 10(b) aiding
and abetting action: (1) a primary violation of Section 10(b); (2) knowledge or
recklessness by the aider-and-abettor as to the existence of the primary violation;
and (3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider-and-
abettor.' 9 The court found both that Central Bank knew the appraisal was
inaccurate and that the respondents had relied upon the inaccurate appraisal in
purchasing the 1988 bonds. This supported a finding of "extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care"'a on the part of Central Bank. Thus, the court
concluded the respondents had established genuine issues of material fact
concerning the "recklessness" and "substantial assistance" elements. Central
Bank petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari raising two issues:
(1) whether an indenture trustee in a bond financing could be held liable
as an aider and abettor of a Rule lOb-5 violation when it had not
breached any of its indenture duties; and (2) whether recklessness
17. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, '114 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994).
18. Id.
19. First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992).
20. Id. at 904.
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satisfties] the scientere requirement for § 10(b) aiding and abetting
even when there [is] no breach of a duty to disclose or act.22
The Court granted certiorari on question two only and, on its own motion,
directed the parties to address the additional question of "[wihether there is an
implied private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."23 The Court's sua sponta action,
concerning what had theretofore been considered a settled issue, was met with
"surprise" by many of the securities bar.2 4
Held: A private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting action
under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. In a five to four decision2" the Court
characterized its "uncontroversial conclusion" 26 as a matter of simple statutory
interpretation. Using settled interpretive methods, the Court concluded
"[blecause the text of [Section] 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under
[Section] 10(b)."27  By so holding, the Court rejected the lower court's
importation of common-law doctrines into the securities law as a basis for
secondary liability.
2
B. The Court's Rationale
The Court's decision included: (1) a comparison of Section 10(b)'s "directly
and indirectly" language with similar language in other provisions of the 1934
'Act, (2) a consideration of the 73rd Congress' intent in enacting Section 10(b),
(3) a review of the origins of aiding and abetting liability and of its present role
in federal law, and (4) a rejection of the argument that Congress has tacitly
acquiesced to civil aiding and abetting liability.
21. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), the Court held
scienter is a prerequisite for a violation of Section 10(b). See infra pan IiI.B.1 and note 100.
22. Olson et al., supra note 14. at 21.
23. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993) (mem.).
24. Olson et al., supra note 14, at 22.
25. The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy. joined by Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg joined.
26. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. CI. 1439, 1448 (1994).
27. Id. at 1455.
28. In the context of Section 10(b). "secondary liability" has a distinct meaning. The term
encompasses judicially implied liability that has been imposed on defendants who do not themselves
engage in any of the proscribed "manipulative or deceptive" conduct, but rather bear some
relationship to those who do. Recognized Section 10(b) secondary liability causes of action include
aiding and abetting (see, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.
Ind. 1966)), conspiracy (see, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)),
and respondeat superior (see, e.g., Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974)).
Money lenders, accountants, lawyers, and other "deep pockets" are the most common defendants in
civil Section 10(b) secondary liability suits.
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1. Section 10(b)'s "Directly and Indirectly" Language
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Central Bank by stating "especially
in cases interpreting [Section] l0(b)" the statutory language is controlling.
Section 10(b) does not expressly address the question of aiding and abetting
liability. Rather, the text of Section 10(b) makes it "unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, .. . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." 3°
In an amicus curiae brief, the SEC urged Congress' inclusion of the term
"indirectly" in Section 10(b) "suggests a legislative purpose fully consistent with
the prohibition of aiding and abetting. 3t The Court, however, found the SEC's
argument unpersuasive for two reasons.
First, noting the federal courts have never relied on Section 10(b)'s "directly
or indirectly" language as a basis for imposing aiding and abetting liability, the
Court remarked the Commission's flawed interpretation of the section arises from
a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of aiding and abetting liobility.
The Court explained "aiding and abetting liability extends beyond persons who
engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding and abetting liability
reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who
give a degree of aid to those who do.",32 Thus, the phrase "directly or indirect-
ly" necessarily excludes aiders and abettors, who merely lend some degree of aid
to those who, directly or indirectly, engage in proscribed conduct.
Second, numerous provisions of the 1934 Act use the phrase "directly or
indirectly" in a manner that does not impose aiding and abetting liability.33
29. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. C1. 1439, 1447 (1994).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988) (emphasis added).
31. Brief for the SEC at 8. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S.
Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854).
32. 114 S. Ct. at 1447.
33. For example, Section 7(f)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(2)(C) (1988), prohibits foreign corporate
and noncorporate entities, in which any United States person "directly or indirectly" owns more than
a 50% interest, from borrowing money for the purpose of purchasing any United States securities.
Section 9(b)(2)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b)(2)-(3) (1988), makes it unlawful for any person to manipulate
the price of any security in which he "directly or indirectly" has any interest in a put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege. "Puts" and "calls" are options which permit their holders to buy or sell a stock or
commodity "at a fixed price for a stated quantity and within a stated period." Black's Law Dictionary
204. 1237 (6th ed. 1990). A "straddle" is "a type of hedge" by which a securities investor acquires an
equal number of puts and calls on the same security or commodity. Id. at 1421. An "option" in the
context of the commodities markets is "[tlhe right-but not the obligation-to buy or sell a futures
contract at a specified price within a fixed period." A "stock option" is the right to buy stock in the
future at a fixed price. Id. at 1094.
Section 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1988), directs any person who, "directly or indirectly,"
becomes the beneficial owner of more than 5% of any registered security to notify the issuer and the
relevant exchanges of his acquisition.
And. Section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988), concerning the liabilities of controlling persons, makes those
who, "directly or indirectly," control anyone liable tinder any provision of the 1934 Act jointly and
severally liable for the controlled person's conduct.
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Thus, to interpret the phrase "directly and indirectly" in Section 10(b) as
imposing liability on aiders and abettors is inconsistent with the meaning of
similar language used in other sections of the same statute.
The Court concluded there is no support for the SEC's contention that
Section 10(b)'s "directly and indirectly" language extends liability to aiders and
abettors. Reinforcing its conclusion, the Court stated "Congress knew how to
impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so."' Thus, the Court
reached:
[Tihe uncontroversial conclusion ... that the text of the 1934 Act does
not itself reach those who aid and abet a [Section] 10(b) violation ....
[Wie think that conclusion resolves the case. It is inconsistent with
settled methodology in [Section] 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond
the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text.
35
2. Inferring Congressional Intent
Section 10(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or
omission) or the commission of a manipulative act ... not ... giving aid to a
person who commits a manipulative or deceptive act."' 6 The Court stated this
finding alone was sufficient grounds upon which to base its holding that Section
10(b) excludes private liability for aiders and abettors. Nevertheless, the Court
added that even if Section 10(b)'s language was not dispositive, a consideration
of Congress' intent in enacting the section would lead to the same conclusion.
To infer how the 73rd Congress would have approached the question of
aiding and abetting liability, the Court examined the express private causes of
action in both the 1934 Act and the contemporaneous Securities Act of 1933
(hereinafter "the 1933 Act").?7 It premised that had Congress expressly
provided for a private Section 10(b) action, it would resemble similar private
actions in the securities law. The Court noted both express private causes of
action in the 1933 Act limit who may be liable thereunder, and neither extends
liability to aiders and abettors." Likewise, none of the four express private
34. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ci. 1439, 1448 (1994).
The Court cited 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), the general criminal aiding and abetting statute, and Section
202 of the Packers and Stockyards Act. 7 U.S.C. § 192(g) (1988), which expressly imposes civil
aiding and abetting liability, as examples of Congress' clear intent to proscribe aiding and abetting.
35. 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
36. Id. (citations omitted).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1988). The Securities Act of 1933 governs the registration and
issuance of securities.
38. Section II, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988), prohibits the making of misrepresentations or the'
omission of material facts in the registration statements of securities. The section expressly identifies
which categories of defendants may be liable for such misrepresentations, but makes no mention of
aiders and abettors. Similarly, Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988), which makes unlawful the sale
of unregistered securities and the sale of securities by means of a prospectus or oral communication
including a material misstatement or omission, expressly imposes liability only on those who sell the
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causes of action in the 1934 Act imposes liability on aiders and abettors3 9
Thus, liability is not imposed on aiders and abettors in any of the express private
causes of action in either the 1933 or the 1934 Acts. From this finding the Court
inferred:
[Ciongress likely would not have attached aiding and abetting liability
to [Section] 10(b) had it provided a private [Section] 10(b) cause of
action. There is no reason to think that Congress would have attached
aiding and abetting liability only to [Section] 10(b) and not to any of
the express private rights of action in the Act.4°
3. Aiding and Abetting Liability in Federal Law
In an alternative theory, Central Bank and other amici contended Congress'
implicitly intended to include civil liability for aiding and abetting in the 1934
Act because aiding and abetting is such a well-established feature of tort law.
The Court, however, found no support for this Contention in the origins of aiding
and abetting liability or in its current position in the federal law.
The Court explained aiding and abetting is "an ancient criminal law
doctrine."'" The doctrine recognizes that one who knowingly aids another in
security. Recently, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995). the Court held Section 12(2)
creates private liability only for material misstatements or omissions made in connection with an
initial public offering and not with secondary transactions.
39. Section 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988), prohibits anvoie from "creating a false or misleading
appearance of active trading in any security" by the use of wash sales (a "fictitious kind of sale" in
which a broker who has simultaneously received a buy and a sell order for the same stock or
commodity circumvents the securities market by transferring the stock or security directly from the
seller to the buyer and pocketing the difference. Black's Law Dictionary 1589 (6th ed. 1990)),
matched orders (a means by which a person effects an anificial appearance of active trading in a
stock or commodity by simultaneously executing a purchase and a sale of the same stock or security,
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (1988)), and other forms of spurious trading. "Anyone" in Section 9 is
qualified by the same "directly and indirectly" language used in Section 10(b) and, therefore,
excludes aiders and abettors.
Section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988), prohibits 10% beneficial owners, directors, and officers from
engaging in short swing trading. Short swing trading occurs when an insider purchases and sells a
corporation's stock within a six month period.
Section 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988), prohibits anyone from making fraudulent statements in reports
mandated by the SEC. "Anyone" here is qualified by the phrase "who shall make or cause to be
made" which necessarily excludes aiders and abettors who merely lend some degree of aid to primary
wrongdoers.
Section 20A. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988). added in 1988, prohibits trading by insiders.
40. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439. 1449 (1994)
(citations omitted). Similarly, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drg Stores, 421 U.S. 723. 736, 95
S. Ct. 1917, 1925-26 (1975), the Court said it would be "anomalous to impute to Congress an
intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it
delineated for comparable expiress causes of action."
41. 114 S. Ct. at 1450. See generally United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938); 1
M. Hale. Pleas of the Crown 615 (1736).
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the commission of a crime himself commits a crime. An analogous doctrine is
found in the common law of torts.4 2 In 1909, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2,
a general aiding and abetting statute applicable to all federal crimes. Under 18
U.S.C. § 2, one who aids and abets another in the commission of any federal
criminal offense, including a criminal violation of the securities laws, is subject
to prosecution as an aider and abettor. Congress, however, has not enacted a
general civil aiding and abetting statute. Rather, it has chosen to impose civil
aiding and abetting liability on a statute-by-statute basis. 3 Accordingly, civil
aiding and abetting liability exists only where Congress has expressly provided
for it. This premise is supported by provisions of the securities laws that
expressly provide for aiding and abetting liability in actions brought by the
SEC. 4 Thus, the Court concluded that considering the disposition of aiding
and abetting liability in federal law, it is unlikely Congress meant to include
aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b) without expressly using language
to that effect.
Civil aiding and abetting liability, therefore, is not an implicit component of
Section 10(b), nor can it be implied as an extension of the general federal
criminal aiding and abetting statute. The Court stated, "[w]e have been quite
reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone.""'
To do so, the Court explained, would be contrary to conventional statutory
interpretive principles and would create far-reaching consequences, namely the
possibility that every criminal prohibition would carry with it the possibility of
civil liability for aiding and abetting. 4
6
4. Tacit Congressional Acquiescence
Respondents contended that even if the 73rd Congress had not intended to
include aiding and abetting within Section 10(b)'s prohibitive scope, subsequent
congressional actions have amounted to a tacit acquiescence to civil Section
10(b) aiding and abetting liability. Respondents based this proposition on two
theories. First, they pointed to two committee hearings in 1983 and 1988 that
42. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1977). See infra note 84.
43. For example, the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6701 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992),
expressly provides for aiding and abetting liability. The Commodity Exchanges Act, 7 U.S.C. §
25(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). also has its own civil aiding and abetting provisions, as do the
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(8) (1988 & Stipp. IV 1992), the Federal Reserve Act, 12
U.S.C. § 504(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and the Packers and Stockyards Act. 7 U.S.C. § 192(g)
(1988).
44. See 15 U.S.C. §78o(b)(4)(E) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (authorizing the SEC to proceed
against brokers and dealers who aid and abet a violation of the 1933 or 1934 Acts); Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (imposing civil liability on those who aid and
abet insider trading violations); 15 U.S.C. § 78L1-2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (imposing civil liability
on brokers and dealers who aid and abet violations of the 1934 Act).




obliquely made reference to Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability.4 7
Respondents argued this was evidence that at least two Congresses have
interpreted Section 10(b) to extend to aiders and abettors." Second, respon-
dents argued Congress' failure to legislatively overrule widespread judicial
recognition of Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability amounts to congressio-
nal acquiescence to such a construction of the section. 9
Countering respondent's argument, Central Bank pointed to three proposed
amendments to the securities law making it "unlawful ... to aid, abet, counsel,
command, induce, or procure the violation of any provision" of the 1934 Act.'s
These bills show at least two Congresses have interpreted Section 10(b) as not
extending to aiders and abettors. Furthermore, the ultimate failure of these
amendments supports the proposition that Section 10(b) continues to exclude
liability for aiding and abetting. The Court found neither party's argument
convincing. It stated such arguments "deserve little weight in the interpretive
process" because they inevitably lead to equally tenable conclusions.5'
C. The Significance of Central Bank
Following Central Bank, Congress' failure to enact provisions detailing the
private Section 10(b) liability scheme can no longer be viewed by the courts as
a mandate to "fill the void with implied remedies."52 Rather, Central Bank has
reestablished the primacy of the statute in interpreting Section 10(b). Having
done such, Central Bank promises to have a significant impact on federal
securities litigation in the future. These effects include the following:
1. The immediate dismissal of private Section 10(b) aiding and abetting
claims. Twenty-five percent of the more than two thousand Section 10(b) cases
brought between 1990 and 1993 involved claims against aiders and abettors.5
3
Following Central Bank, these claims no longer have a basis.
47. H.R. Rep. No. 910, 100th Cong.. 2d Sess., 27-28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043. 6064-65; H.R. Rep. No. 355. 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 10 (1983).
48. 114 S. Ct. at 1452.
49. Id.
50. S. 2545, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. § 20 (1957); S. 1179, 861h Cong., 1st Sess. § 22 (1959); S.
3770, 86th Cong.. 2d Sess. § 20 (1960).
51. 114 S. Ct. at 1453. The Court explained. "It is 'impossible to assert with any degree of
assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional approval of the
[courts'] statutory interpretation. Congress may legislate, moreover, only through passage of a bill
which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President. Congressional inaction cannot
amend a duly enacted statute."' Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175
n.1, 109 S. Ci. 2363, 2371 n.) (1989) (quoting Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1472-73 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting))) (citations
omitted).
52. Olson et al., supra note 14, at 24.
53. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 588-89.
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2. The dismissal of SEC actions brought under the theory of aiding and
abetting. The dissent noted, "[tihe majority leaves little doubt that the [1934
Act] does not even permit the Commission to pursue aiders and abettors in civil
enforcement actions under Section 10(b)."' The language found dispositive in
Central Bank is the same language supporting SEC enforcement actions.
55
Having lost one of its most important enforcement mechanisms, the SEC will be
pressured to use its other statutory powers to prosecute Section 10(b) aiders and
abettors.5 6
3. The attempted reformulation of aiders and abettors as primary violators.
The preclusion of aiding and abetting liability, and presumably other forms of
secondary liability under Section 10(b), will force plaintiffs to cast aiders and
abettors as primary violators of the section. The Court noted any person
"including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under [Section 10(b)],
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under [Section 10(b)] are
met."" However, considering the traditional elements of the private Section
10(b) action,"' it is uncertain how successful this repackaging will be.5 9
4. The overruling of other forms of secondary liability under Section 10(b).
Central Bank's holding casts serious doubt on other well-established forms of
54. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1460 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Applying the rationale of Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980), the Court's
holding in Cent*ral Bank applies equally to SEC actions. See infra patl III.B.3. See also SEC v.
Militano, No. 89 CIV. 572, 1994 WL 285472, at *9 (S.D.NY. Jun. 23. 1994) ("While not
specifically holding that the SEC may not bring a civil enforcement action for aiding and abetting
... the Supreme Court's ruling suggests such a result.").
56. See e.g., Section 202 of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 202. 104 Stat. 931 (1990), which authorizes the SEC to assess fines
against regulated individuals who aid and abet a securities violation, and Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1988), which authorizes the SEC to administratively prosecute
a broker-dealer who "willfully" aids and abets a violation of the securities laws.
57. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994).
58. The elements of the private Section 10(b) action include the following: "(I) use of an
instrumentality of interstate commerce; (2) the making by the defendant of a material misrepresenta-
tion or omission; (3) an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud (scienter); (4) reliance by the
plaintiff on the defendant's misrepresentations; (5) causation; (6) damages flowing from the
defendant's misconduct." Olson et al., supra note 14, at 23.
59. For example, in Central Bank respondents in oral arguments conceded Central Bank did
not engage in manipulative or deceptive conduct within the meaning of Section 10(b). Transcript of
Oral Argument of Miles M. Gersh, Esq., on Behalf of the Respondents at 31-32. Central Bank of
Denver. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ci. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854) ("Question: ... [DJo
you concede that you could not have charged Central Bank as a primary violator .... ; Mr. Gersh:
Yes, I would concede that.... [T]he primary violation here was a fraudulent bond deal .... [Tlhe
only way that we could reach [Central Bank] Linder the securities laws . . . was ... aiding and
abetting .... "). The recklessness issue, see infra note 100. becomes especially important in the
context of implicating a secondary actor in a primary violation of Section 10(b).
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secondary liability not expressly addressed in the securities laws. Similar to
aiding and abetting, the liability actions of respondeat superior, conspiracy, and
agency have no statutory basis under Section 10(b).w
5. Legislative activity. Central Bank has already resulted in legislative
initiatives to overturn it. On January 18, 1995, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 was simultaneously introduced in the House and the
Senate.6' Introducing the legislation in the House, Representative Edward J.
Markey (D-Mass.) explained one of the express purposes of the bill is to
"(o]verturn the Supreme Court's Central Bank of Denver decision by fully
restoring liability to those who knowingly or reckless[ly] aid or abet securities
fraud. '62 The House version of bill not only legislatively overrules Central
Bank, but also gives the SEC the express statutory authority to prosecute aiders
and abettors under Section 10(b).63 Senators Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.)
and Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.), who introduced the Senate version of the bill,
have taken a less confrontational approach. As introduced, the Senate version
of the Reform Act makes no reference to reviving Section 10(b) aiding and
abetting liability, but its sponsors have indicated they "would be willing to
address the Bank of Denver decision as part of our deliberations."(, While this
legislation is pending, the fate of Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability
remains uncertain.
The Court in Central Bank has put the securities bar on notice that other
well-established Section 10(b) doctrines are now subject to attack. Following
Central Bank, the Supreme Court will resolve future securities issues in the
following manner:
(a) the scope of the statute should be determined, where possible, based
exclusively on the language of the statute; (b) only if the language of
the statute is unclear should the scope of the statute be determined by
reference to the legislative history of the statute; (c) the relevant
legislative history is the legislative history at the time the statute was
enacted, not subsequent legislative history; (d) policy should not
override statutory language and legislative history unless the statute
would otherwise produce "bizarre" results that Congress could not have
intended; and (e) perhaps most importantly, even a long-settled
60. For a thorough analysis of this proposition, see generally Fischel, supra note I.
61. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995); S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
62. 141 Cong. Rec.'E1l5,116 (daily ed. January 18, 1995) (extension of remarks of Rep.
Markey).
63. 141 Cong. Rec. H2717,2718 (daily ed. March 6, 1995) (amendment to H.R. 1058 offered
by Rep. Markey).
64. 141'Cong. Rec. S1070,1090 (daily ed. January 18, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). During
the 103d Congress, Senators Dodd and Domenici introduced legislation, similar to S. 240, offering
broad reform of private securities litigation and expressly overruling Central Bank. S. 1976, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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construction of a statute by the lower courts cannot provide a gloss to
the statute that is inconsistent with its language.6
III. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT
A. The Origin of Section 10(b) Aiding and Abetting Liability
The text of Section 10(b) provides no private remedies.' Rather, the 1934
Act charges the SEC with enforcement of Section 10(b). Finding this enforce-
ment mechanism insufficient to meet the broad-based remedial purposes6 of the
1934 Act, courts have implied an extrastatutory private cause of action under
Section 10(b).
1. The Implied Private Section 10(b) Cause of Action
A private cause of action under Section 10(b) was first implied in Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co." This case concerned a scheme in which three
conspirators fraudulently induced Kardon to sell stock at a price far below its
true value. Upon discovery of the fraud, Kardon sued the conspirators for
damages, alleging they had engaged in conduct proscribed by Section 10(b).
Arguing that no provision of Section .10(b) provided for civil suits, the
defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds of no right of action.69
The defendants' argument primarily focused on the statutory framework of
the 1934 Act. They contended Congress' express inclusion of private rights of
action in other sections of the Act 7' prohibited the implication of a private
action under Section 10(b). Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius. The court,
however, found the defendants' argument unpersuasive. It reasoned, "[w]ere the
whole question one of statutory interpretation [the defendant's argument] might
be convincing, but the question is only partly such." The court stated, "[t]he
disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort."' 2 More-
over, the right of an injured party to recover damages resulting from the violation
of a statute is "fundamental and ... deeply ingrained in the law."73 Thus, in
the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, a private cause of action is
always implied by a proscriptive statute. Invoking the maxim ubijus ibi remedi-
65. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 590.
66. Moreover, the Court has established the legislative history of Section 10(b) provides no
"indication that Congress considered the problem of private suits under it at the time of its passage."
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1922 (1975).
67. See infra part IV.A.2.
68. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
69. Id. at 513.
70. See supra note 39.
721. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Stipp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
72. td. at 513.
73. Id. at 514.
1995] 1021
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
urn-where there is a right, there is a remedy 74 -the court held a private
plaintiff may bring suit under Section 10(b), even though the statute does not
expressly provide for a private cause of action.
By 1971, the implied Section 10(b) private action had been recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v.
Bankers Loss & Casualty Co.75 And by 1976, the Court had stated:
Although Section 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil
remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the
Commission when adopting Rule lOb-5, contemplated such a remedy,
the existence of a private cause of action for violations of the statute
and the Rule is now well established.76
2. Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b)
Twenty years after civil liability under Section 10(b) was first implied in
Kardon, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
addressed the issue of whether this now "well established"' 7 action imposed
civil liability on aiders and abettors. In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Insurance C0., 71 the district court held "damages... may... be imposed upon
persons who do no more than aid and abet a violation of Section 10(b)." '79
Brennan involved a class action suit brought against Midwestern United Life
Insurance Co. ("Midwestern") by a group of its shareholders. The plaintiff-class
alleged Dobrich Securities Corp. ("Dobrich"), a brokerage firm, had illegally
retained proceeds from the sale of Midwestern's stock for use in speculative
investing.- The plaintiff-class further alleged Midwestern had aided and abetted
Dobrich's fraud.
Conceding that Dobrich had, in fact, engaged in conduct proscribed by
Section 10(b), Midwestern contended the section did not impose liability on
aiders and abettors. Midwestern asserted that Section 10(b)'s legislative history
74. Id. at 513 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 40, 36 S. Ct. 482. 484
(1916)). This maxim is reflected in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1977) which reads in
pertinent part:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for the invasion of an interest of another if; (a) the
intent of the enactment is exclusive in part to protect an interest of the other as an
individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect.
The Kardon court stated "[t]his rule is more than merely a canon of statutory interpretation." 69 F.
Supp. at 513 (emphasis added).
75. 404 U.S. 6. 13 n.9, 92 S. Ct. 165, 169 n.9 (1971).
.76. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1382 (1976) (emphasis
added).
77. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
78. Id. (motion to dismiss denied),'286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits after trial),
aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989,90 S. Ct. 1122 (1970).
79. 259 F. Supp. at 681.
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supported its contention. 0 The court disagreed, stating "this legislative history
sheds little, if any, light on the Congressional understanding of the applicability
of Section 10(b) to aiders and abettors."8' Instead, the court followed the
rationale used by the Kardon court in implying a private Section 10(b) action,
by stating "[aippropriate general principles of law should continue to guide the
development of federal common law remedies under Section 10(b)."'82 General
common-law tort principles dictate that "knowing assistance of... a fraudulent
scheme ... gives rise to liability equal to that of the perpetrators themselves.
893
The court concluded this principle, reflected in the Restatement of Torts, Section
876,8 promoted the underlying goal of the 1934 Act-full disclosure in the
post-issuance securities markets 85-and was a "natural complement to the
Kardon doctrine.""
Thus, Brennan established the Section 10(b) civil aiding and abetting private
action. This doctrine subsequently became widely accepted.8"
B. The Dominant Rationale: Strict Statutory Construction
. The private right of action implied under Section 10(b) is entirely a creation
of the courts and is, therefore, subject to the vagaries of judicial interpretation.
Because both the scope and the elements of the action are determined by the
courts and not by Congress, it has assumed variable forms since its first
recognition in Kardon. Prior to 1976, an expansive, activist approach to
interpreting the private Section 10(b) action predominated in the lower courts.
Section 10(b) became, in effect, the flexible tool used by the courts to combat
80. The Midwestern court cited Congress' failure to adopt amendments that expressly provided
for Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability as indicative of its intent to exclude such liability from
the scope of the section. See S. 2545, 85th Cong.. Ist Sess. § 20 (1957); S. 1179. 86th Cong.. Ist
Sess. § 22 (1959): S. 3770, 86th Cong.. 2d Sess. § 20 (1960).
81. 259 F. Stipp. at 677. After a lengthy consideration of the proposed legislation and the
congressional deliberations thereof, the court concluded by quoting Justice Frankfurter: "To explain
the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative
unrealities." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20, 60 S. Ct. 444, 451 (1940).
82. 259 F. Supp. at 680.
83. Id. (quoting Pettit v. American Stock Exch.. 217 F. Supp. 21. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)).
84. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1977) reads in pertinent part:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject
to liability if he...
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
85. See infra part IV.A.I.
86. 259 F. Supp. at 680.
87. See supra note 9. For a detailed exposition on the origin and development of aiding and
abetting liability under Section 10(b) and other provisions of the securities laws prior to Central
Bank, see Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A
Critical Examination, 52 AIb. L. Rev. 637 (1988).
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any and all types of fraudulent conduct in the exchange of securities.8  By ad
hoc incorporation of common-law principles, the private Section 10(b) action was
defined and redefined at the courts' discretion. In time, the "catchall"8 9 Section
10(b) action assumed an amorphous and inconsistent form among the federal
circuits. This inconsistency led to confusion and unpredictability in the litigious
field of securities fraud.9° Then in the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court "awoke
... to the rapid growth" of the private Section 10(b) action, and a new era of
judicial restraint began.9'
In 1976 in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,92 the Supreme Court held statutory
language was dispositive in determining the scope of Section 10(b). This
pronouncement represented a shift in the Court's interpretation of Section 10(b).
Judicial interpretations of Section 10(b) would now be subject to the strict
constraints of the section's language. A trend of restrictive interpretation of
Section 10(b) subsequently became evident in Santa Fe Industries v. Green93
and in Aaron v. SEC.94 Central Bank, which effectively overrules Brennan, is
the most recent example of this restrictive trend.
1. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
In Ernst & Ernst,9 the issue was the mental state required for a Section
10(b) violation. Heralding the advent of a new, restrictive era in the interpreta-
tion of the Section 10(b) action, the Court stated "[i]n addressing this question,
we turn first to the language of [Section] 10(b), for '[t]he starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." '96
In Ernst & Ernst, the plaintiffs, customers of First Securities Co., a
brokerage firm, alleged Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm retained by First
Securities, had violated Section 10(b) by failing to exercise reasonable care in
auditing First Securities' operations. 97 With the promise of high returns, First
88. Recognizing the extensive and creative uses the lower courts had made of the judicially
implied private Section 10(b) action, Justice Rehnquist in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723,737,95 S. Ct. 1917, 1926 (1975), characterized the Section 10(b) action as "a judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn."
89. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1385 (1976).
90. For example, the Seventh Circuit devised a significantly different test from the other circuits
for imposing aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b). See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co.,
915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990). cert. denied. 499 U.S. 923, .111 S. Ct. 1317 (1991); Mary T.
Doherty, Note, Aiding and Abetting Secturities Fraud, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 829, 840 & n.64 (1992).
91. Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Law 823 (1993).
92. 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
93. 430 U.S. 462, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
94. 446 U.S. 680, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
95. 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
96. Id. at 197, 96 S. Ct. at 1383 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 756, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1935 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
97. These audits were made for the purposes of complying with Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1988), which provides that securities brokers "make and keep ... such records,
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Securities' president, Leston B. Nay, had induced the plaintiffs to invest in a
fraudulent securities scheme. Unknown to the plaintiffs, Nay had converted their
funds to his personal use immediately upon receipt. Nay continued this scheme
undetected for twenty-two years, until he committed suicide and left a note
divulging the fraud and First Securities' insolvency.9"
The defrauded investors brought a Section 10(b) aiding and abetting suit
against Ernst & Ernst. They alleged the accounting firm had negligently failed
to use "appropriate auditing procedures"" in auditing First Securities. An
adequate audit would have led to the detection of Nay's fraudulent conduct. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of "whether a private cause
of action for damages will lie under (Section] 10(b) ... in the absence of any
allegation of 'scienter.""
In an anicus curiae brief, the SEC argued the remedial purposes of the 1934
Act support its broad application. Specifically, the Commission contended that
since the effect upon investors of fraudulent conduct, whether intentional or
negligent, is indistinguishable, Congress must have intended to proscribe all such
conduct. Rejecting this interpretation, the Court reasoned, "the Commission
... copies... and reports as the [SEC). by rule, prescribes as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest. for the protection of investors."
98. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 189, 96 S. Ct. 1375. 1379 (1976).
99. Id. at 190, 96 S. Ct. at 1379.
100. Id. at 193, 96 S. Ct. at 1381. In Ernst & Ernst, the Court defined "scienter" as the "mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12, 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "scienter" to mean "[klnowingly":
The term is used in pleading to signify an allegation ... setting out the defendant's
previous knowledge of the cause which led to the injury complained of, or rather his
previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard against, and his
omission to do which has led to the injury complained of. The term is frequently used
to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge.
Black's Law Dictionary 1345 (6th ed. 1990). The Courts of Appeals have uniformly held
"recklessness is sufficient sciunter for a primary violation of § 10(b)." First Interstate Bank v. Pring,
969 F.2d 891, 901 (10th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court recognized that "[iln certain areas of the
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability
for some act [sic]." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185. 194 n.12. 96 S. Ct. 1375. 1381 n.12.
The Court has, however, expressly declined to address the recklessness issue in the context of Section
10(b) liability. id. For an informative analysis of the Section '10(b) recklessness question, see Elaine
E. Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 213 (1977).
Although the Supreme Court granted writs in Central Rank in part 'on the question "[d]oes
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for aiding and abetting even where there is no breach
of a duty to disclose or to act." in its opinion it chose to ignore the question, finding dispositive its
analysis of the sua sponte question of whether Section 10(b) provided for private aiding and abetting
liability. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 16. 1992) (No. 92-854).
Recently, the recklessness issue has received congressional attention, On January 25. 1995, U.S.
Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to limit liability under Section 10(b) to instances of
intentional conduct only. H.R. 681. 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995). The recklessness issue remains
an important and unresolved question concerning Section 10(b) liability.
1995] 1025
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
would add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from
its commonly accepted meaning."' 0' Moreover, the Court stated the SEC's
argument ignored the "unmistakable" 2 meaning of Section 10(b)'s text.
Turning to the statutory language, the Court reasoned the use of the words
"'manipulative' 3 or deceptive' in conjunction with 'device or contrivance'
strongly suggests that Section 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or
intentional misconduct"'O' and not negligence. Thus, the Court held a finding
of scienter was a requirement for Section 10(b) liability. In addition to the text
of Section 10(b) which "so clearly connotes intentional misconduct,"'05 the
Court supported its conclusion by considering the statutory framework. The
Court noted that in every instance, in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, in which
Congress expressly created civil liability in favor of purchasers or sellers of
securities, it specified the mental state required for recovery.'O' Furthermore,
101. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185, 199-200, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1383 (1976).
102. Id. at 200, 96 S. Ct. at 1384.
103. In the context of the securities laws the term "manipulate" is especially instructive: "It
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities," Id.
104. Id. at 197, 96 S. Ct. at 1383.
105. Id. at 201, 96 S. Ct. at 1384.
106. The 1933 Act, Sections II, 12, and 15: Section 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988), makes an
issuer absolutely liable, regardless of fault, for making misleading statements in a securities
registration statement. See § I I(a). Experts, such as "accountants, engineers, or appraisers," wlo
have assisted in the preparation of such statements are accorded a defense to civil liability in that they
may assert that "after reasonable investigation" they had "reasonable ground[s] to believe ... that
the statements therein were true." See § I l(b)(3)(B)(i). The Supreme Court has recognized that "this
is a negligence standard." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185, 208. 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1388
(1976). Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988). imposes absolute liability on any person who "offers
or sells" an unregistered security. See § 12(1). Any person who offers or sells a security by means
of a prospectus or oral communication which includes an untrue material fact or omits a material fact
is liable to the person purchasing the security for the purchase price, unless he can "sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission." See § 12(2). Section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988), makes every person
who, by agreement or otherwise, controls any person liable under Sections I I or 12, jointly and
severally liable with the controlled person. The "controlling person'* may escape liability by proving
he had "no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." This likewise is a negligence
standard.
The 1934 Act, Sections 9, 18, and 20: Under Section 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988), liability is
imposed on anyone who "willfully" creates the false appearance of active trading in any security.
Section 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988), imposes liability on any person who makes a false or misleading
statement in a report, application, or document filed pursuant to the 1934 Act, unless he proves "he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." Similar to
Section 15 of the 1933 Act, Section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (198), creates civil liability for those who
control any person who violates any provision of the 1934 Act. The "controlling person" may escape
liability by proving he "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action."
Each of these sections "contains a state-of-mind condition requiring something more than
negligence." 425 U.S. at 209 n.28, 96 S. Ct. at 1388 n.28.
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those sections of the securities acts that expressly provide for recovery for
negligent conduct do so subject to "significant procedural restrictions not
applicable under Section 10(b)" 0 7 The absence of comparable procedural
limitations under Section 10(b) suggested to the Court that it would be
inconsistent with the statutory structure to extend the 10(b) action to include
negligent conduct. The Court stated it was reluctant to disturb this carefully
drawn statutory scheme.'08
Reiterating the need for strict adherence to the statute's text in defining the
scope of the Section 10(b) action, the Court concluded:
When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and
deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances-the
commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite
unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct.' 9
In the wake of Ernst & Ernst, at least one commentator recognized the
Court's approach "casts some doubt on the continued viability of aiding and
abetting liability."'" 0  Professor Fischel, in a landmark article, noted that
although the Court purported to reserve the issue of aiding and abetting liability
in Ernst & Ernst, it had, in effect, all but determined the fate of secondary
liability under Section 10(b) by holding the section's language was controlling.
Foreshadowing Central Bank, Fischel concluded the Court in Ernst & Ernst
"implicitly held that aiding and abetting liability does not exist apart from
liability that could be imposed for a direct violation.""'
2. Santa Fe Industries v. Green
Less than a year after Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court again was faced
with a question concerning the substantive scope of Section 10(b). In Santa Fe
Industries v. Green," 2 the issue was whether Santa Fe Industries ("Santa Fe"),
a majority shareholder in the Kirby Lumber Co. ("Kirby"), had violated Section
.10(b) in connection with a Delaware "short-form merger.""' 3 Pursuant to the
107. 425 U.S. at 208-09, 96 S. Ct. at 1388. For example, Section I I of the 1933 Act, see supra
note 106, grants the court the discretion to require a plaintiff bringing suit tinder. Sections 11, 12(2).
or 15 of the 1933 Act to post a bond for court costs and, in some instances, to assess costs at the
conclusion of the suit.
108. 425 U.S. at 210. 96 S. Ct. at 1389.
109. Id. at 215, 96 S. Ct. at 139i.
I10. Fischel, supra note 1, at 88.
Ill. Id. The Court noted Professor Fischel's influential views in Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1444 (1994): "Professor Fischel opined that the 'theory of secondary liability
[under Section 10(b)] was no longer viable in light of recent Supreme Coun decisions strictly
interpreting thi federal securities laws."
112. 430 U.S. 467, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
113. The Delaware "short-form merger" law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 253, 262 (1975 & Supp.
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Delaware law, Santa Fe sought to acquire 100% ownership of its subsidiary
Kirby by buying out the minority shareholders' interest. Unsatisfied with the
terms of the statutory merger, a group of Kirby's shareholders brought suit in
federal court against Santa Fe." 4  They alleged Santa Fe had obtained a
fraudulent appraisal of Kirby's assets for the purpose of "freez[ingj out the
minority stockholders at a wholly inadequate price."" 5  This deceptive and
manipulative conduct, the plaintiffs further alleged, was in violation of Section
10(b). The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for failure to state a
claim, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed." 6  The
United States Supreme Court granted Santa Fe's petition for certiorari to consider
the substantive reach of Section 10(b). 117
Relying heavily on Ernst & Ernst and on the proposition that the "[a]scer-
tainment of congressional intent with respect to the standard of liability created
by a particular section of the [1933 and 1934] Acts must ... rest primarily on
the language of that section,"''" the Court reversed. It held Santa Fe had not
engaged in any deceptive conduct within the meaning of Section 10(b)." 9
Concerning the plaintiffs' allegation that Santa Fe had been manipulative in
its dealings, the Court explained "the conduct alleged in the complaint was not
'manipulative' within the meaning of the statute."' 2'  The Court stated "manip-
ulative," as used in the context of the securities laws, is "virtually a term of
art"' 2' referring generally to such specific practices as "wash sales, matched
orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially
affecting market activity."'22  Whereas Congress intended Section 10(b) to
prohibit the full gamut of "manipulative" devices, it did not intend to include
within its scope such an "instance of corporate mismanagement"'23 as had been
alleged by the plaintiffs. To do so would be to extend Section 10(b) to an area
1976), allows a parent corporation holding at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to acquire full
ownership of the subsidiary by the cash purchase of the minority's shares. This merger may be
effected without advance notice to, or consent of, the minority's shareholders. However, any
minority shareholder who finds the parent's per share price unsatisfactory has the right to petition
the Delaware Court of Chancery for a decree ordering the parent corporation to pay him the fair
market value for the shares.
114. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). By filing suit under Section
10(b), the shareholders ignored the procedural remedy afforded them by the Delaware statute. See
supra note 113.
115. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 467, 468. 97 S. Ct. 1292, 1298 (1977).
116. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
117. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 429 U.S. 814, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (mem.).
118. 430 U.S. at 473. 97 S. Ct. at 1300 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S; 185,
200, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1384 (1976)).
119. Id. at 474-75, 96 S. Ct. at 1300-01.
120. Id. at 476, 97 S. Ct, at 1302.
121. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199, 96 S. Ci. 1375, 1384 (1976)),
122. Id. For an explanation of "wash sales," "matched orders," and "rigged prices," see supra
note 39.
123. Id. at 477, 97 S. Ct. at 1302.
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of corporate conduct traditionally relegated to state law and to pose a "danger of
vexatious litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of
plaintiffs.'
12 4
3. Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission
In Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Comnission,IU the Court was
confronted with a question it had expressly reserved in Ernst & Ernst-whether
scienter is a necessary element of an injunctive action brought by the SEC under
Section 10(b).' As in Santa Fe, the Court returned to Ernst & Ernst to
resolve this issue.
In Aaron, the SEC brought an injunctive action, alleging violations of
Section 10(b), against a manager of a New York brokerage firm. The
Commission alleged the defendant intentionally failed to prevent his employees
from making fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the financial condition of
the Lawn-A-Mat Corp. These misrepresentations were made for the purposes of
soliciting purchase orders for Lawn-A-Mat's stock.
Ordering the injunction, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York found the defendant intentionally failed to take adequate steps to prevent
the employees from making fraudulent statements concerning Lawn-A-Mat's
financial condition. 7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
but declined to address the question of whether the defendant's conduct
constituted scienter, a requirement for civil Section 10(b) liability as established
by Ernst & Ernst. It held, instead, a finding of negligence is sufficient to
support a claim for injunctive relief under the 1934 Act. 2 s The Second Circuit
distinguished Ernst & Ernst on the basis of "compelling distinctions between
private damages actions and government injunction actions. ' 129 The Supreme
Court granted writs to consider whether scienter must be alleged by the SEC in
a suit for injunctive relief under Section 10(b)."3 °
124. Id. at 479. 97 U.S. at 1304 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 421 U.S.
723, 740, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1927 (1975)).
125. 446 U.S. 680, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
126. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185. 194 n.12, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1381 n.12 (1976).
Injunctive relief is one of the civil enforcement mechanism expressly provided by the 1934 Act.
Section 2 1(d) of the 1934 Act provides:
(d)(1) When ever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged in acts
or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this title, ... it may in its
discretion bring an action ... to enjoin such acts or practices....
15 U.S.C. § 78u (1988).
127. SEC v. Aaron, 1997 WL 1013 (D.C.N.Y. May 5. 1977).
128. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 1979).
129. Id. at 621. The Second Circuit proposed that the "two types of suits under § 10(b) advance
different goals: actions for damages are designed to provide compensation to individual investors,
whereas suits for injunctive relief serve.to provide maximum protection to the investing public."
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 685 n.3, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 n.3 (1980).
130. The Court in Aaron again expressly reserved a question that it had first reserved in Ernst
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Finding the Second Circuit's "compelling distinctions" unpersuasive, the
Court applied Ernst & Ernst and held scienter is a necessary element for all
violations of Section 10(b), regardless of who initiates the suit. Its conclusion
"rested on several grounds," including the "plain meaning"'of Section 10(b),the
section's legislative history, and the' statutory framework.' 3' The Court
concluded, "[i]n our view, the rationale of [Ernst & Ernst] ineluctably leads to
the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of Section 10(b) .
regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.", 32
Thus, the Court in Santa Fe and Aaron applied the interpretive approach
established in Ernst & Ernst to restrict the substantive scope of Section 10(b).
These cases represent the dominant approach employed by the Court since 1976
to resolve Section 10(b) issues.
C. An Inconsistent Rationale: The Duty to Disclose, 133 Chiarella, and
Dirks
After Ernst & Ernst, it appeared future Section 10(b) questions would be
resolved in'this same manner-by carefully considering the section's text, the
statutory -framework, and Congress' intent in enacting the statute. However, in
1980, Chiarella v. United States'34 suggested otherwise.
1. Chiarella v. United States
In Chiarella, the issue was whether a person who learns of an impending
corporate acquisition from the handling of company documents violates Section
10(b) if he fails to disclose the information before trading in the target
company's stock. Chiarella was employed as a "markup man" for a New York
financial printer. Over a two-year period, he "marked-up" five corporate
takeover bid announcements. Although the names of the acquiring and target
companies were left blank, Chiarella was able to deduce the corporations'
identities from other information included in the documents. By trading on this
information, Chiarella realized gains over $30,000.' 35
Chiarella's lucrative forays into the securities market did not go unnoticed.
The SEC instituted an investigation into Chiarella's suspicious trading activities.
& Entst-whether recklessness may constitute scienter under some circumstances. 446 U.S. at 686
n.5, 100 S. Ct. at 1950 n.5. See supra note 100.
131. Id. at 690, 100 S. Ct. at 1952.
132. Id. at 691. 100 S. Ct. at 1955-3. The court noted Section 21(d) of the 1934 Act, see supra
note 126, which authorizes the Commission to seek injunctive relief against violators or prospective
violators of any provision of the 1934 Act. "neither ... addls] nor ... detractfs] from the requisite
showing of scienter" under Section 10(b) and Rule M0b.5. Id. at 700, 100 S. Ct. at 1957.
133. For an explanation of the "duty of disclosure" in the context of insider trading, see infra
note 139.
134. 445 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).
135. Id. at 224, 100 S. Ct. at 1113.
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Chiarella was indicted and convicted on seventeen counts of violating Section
10(b). t3 The trial court held Chiarella "owed a duty to everyone; to all sellers,
indeed, to the market as a whole" to disclose knowledge of insider information
before trading on it.' Chiarella's conviction was upheld by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 38 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to ascertain the legal effect of Chiarella's insider trading. 39
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging "the starting point of our
inquiry is the language of [Section 10(b)],"' 4 ° but then concluded "Section
10(b) does not state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive
*device."'' It is at this point where the Court's interpretive approach diverged
from the trend established by Ernst & Ernst and its progeny. Instead of looking
to the statutory structure and other indicia of congressional intent to determine
136. Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.' § 78ff(a) (1988), sanctions criminal penalties
against "(any person who willfully violates any provision (of the 1934 Act]." Chiarella's seventeen
counts represented his receipt of seventeen different stock purchase confirmation orders in a fourteen
month period. Chiarella was the first case in which nondisclosure was the basis for the imposition
of criminal liability upon a purchaser under Section 10(b). 445 U.S. at 236, 100 S. Ct. at 1118.
137. Id. at 231, 100 S. Ct. at 1116.
138. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
139. "Insider trading" refers to transactions in the securities of publicly held corporations by
"persons with inside or advanced information on which the trading is based." Black's Law
Dictionary 796 (6th ed. 1990). The general concept of insider trading was first recognized as
prohibited by Section 10(b) in hi re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961):
We have already noted that the anti-fraud provisions are phrased in terms of "any person"
and that a special obligation has been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g..
officers, directors and controlling stockholders. These three groups, however, do not
exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation.
Id. at 912. In Cady, Roberts, the Commission defined the two elements of an insider trading
violation:
fFlirst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
Id. As a consequence of the "inherent unfairness" of an insider trading transaction, the SEC in Cady,
Roberts established a duty of disclosure on insiders explaining, "[ilf purchasers on an exchange had
available material information known [only) by a selling insider, we may assume that their investment
judgment would be affected and their decision whether to buy might accordingly be modified.
Consequently, any sales by the insider must await disclosure of that information." Id. at 914. Since
Cady, Roberts, the courts have.been involved in an effort to determine what, if any, relationship a
person must have with a corporation to be subject to the obligations of an insider. Chiarella and
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983), represent the Supreme Court's attempts to
delineate the contours of the Section 10(b) insider trading action and the correlative duty of
disclosure. Central Bank suggests these opinions, which borrow heavily from the common law of
insider trading, are too restrictive. See infra part IV.A. For a thorough analysis of the history of
insider trading under Section 10(b), see C. Edward Fletcher, Materials on the Law of Insider Trading
99-255 (1991).
140. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 225, 226, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1113 (1980) (quoting Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185, 197, 96 S. CI. 1375. 1382 (1976)).
141. Id.
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the legal effects of Chiarella's silence, the Court turned to the common law of
fraud.
The common law states a "party charged with failing to disclose market
information must be under a duty to disclose it.""112 Historically, this duty
arose by virtue of the "unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take
advantage of ... (insider] information by trading without disclosure." '43  The
Court stated this common-law duty had been adopted by the SEC in Cady,
Roberts & Co. 4' In Cady, Roberts, an administrative decision,.the SEC held
members of a brokerage firm had violated Section 10(b) by selling securities on
the basis of material, nonpublic information obtained from a director of the issuer
corporation, who was also employed by the same brokerage firm. The director,
the SEC explained, was privy to "insider" information. As such, he was subject
to the duty traditionally imposed on "insiders"-to disclose material information
to persons with whom he deals in the trading of the securities of his corpora-
tion. 145
The Chiarella Court concluded Cady, Roberts stood for the following
principle:
[Slilence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may
operate as a fraud actionable under Section 10(b) despite the absence of
statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the
legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is premised upon a duty to
142. Id. at 229, 100 S. Ct. at 1115 (quoting Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc.,
524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975)). Traditionally, the common law only imposes the duty to disclose
material, nonpublic corporate information on corporate fiduciaries who personally (face-to-face)
undertake stock transactiods with other stockholders. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass.
1933) ("(W]here a director personally seeks a stockholder for the purpose of buying his shares
without making disclosure of material facts within his peculiar knowledge and not within reach of
the stockholder, the transaction will be closely scrutinized and relief may be granted .... "). See also
Strong v. Riptide,213 U.S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521 (1909) (holding plaintiff-shareholder stated a cause
of action by alleging majority shareholder used agents to purchase stock from plaintiff without first
disclosing impending, lucrative real estate deal); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531, 535 (Kan. 1932)
("Directors act in a fiduciary capacity in management of corporate affairs, and a director negotiating
with a shareholder for purchase of shares acts in a relation of scrupulous trust and confidence....
(S]uch transactions must be subject to the closest scrutiny .... "). This common-law duty does not
extend to fiduciaries who trade on insider information on impersonal stock exchanges. 186 N.E. at
661.
In Chiarella, the Court ignores the distinction between impersonal market trading and personal
transactions and evokes a "common-law" duty of disclosure that extends to all fiduciaries who engage
in insider trading through the securities markets or otherwise.
143. 445 U.S. at 227, 100 S. Ct. at 1114 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
912 & n.15 (1961)).
144. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). This assertion is somewhat disingenuous in light of the open-ended
language of the Cady, Robert's decision, the plain meaning of Section 10(b), and the 73d Congress'
intent in adopting the 1934 Act. See infra part IV.A.
145. Id. at 914.
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disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction. 146
Applying this "common law rule,"' 47 the Court reversed the Second Circuit and
held that in the absence of a duty to speak, Section 1 0(b) does not impose a general.
duty to disclose inside information before trading on it. The Court found Chiarella
had no fiduciary (or quasi-fiduciary relationship) with any of the target corporations
in whose stock he traded. Accordingly, he had no affirmative duty to disclose to
the sellers, or to the public-at-large, his knowledge of inside information before
trading in the target corporations' stock. Therefore, the Court held Chiarella had
not violated Section 10(b)) 8
2. Dirks v. SEC
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of nondisclosure under Section 10(b)
in Dirks v. SEC. 49 Again, the Court ignored Ernst & Ernst. The issue was
whether an investment analyst who received material, nonpublic information from
a corporate insider violated Section 10(b) by relaying this information to his clients
who, in turn, traded upon it. Secrist, a former insider of Equity Funding, a
California insurance company, had informed Dirks, the analyst, that the company
was vastly overvalued as a result of fraudulent bookkeeping.
The Commission found Dirks had aided and abetted violations of Section 10(b)
by disclosing insider information to his clients concerning Equity Funding's
condition. Establishing a "disclose-or-refrain-from-trading" rule applicable to
tippees,"'5 the SEC's administrative hearing judge concluded:
Where "tippees"-regardless of their motivation or occupation--come
into possession of material "corporate information that they know is
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,".
they must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from
trading.'5'
Dirks appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia-Circuit.
Affirming the SEC's holding, the court reiterated the Commission's position
stating, "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to whom they
146. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222;230, 100 S. Ct. 1108. 1115(1980) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 229, 100 S. Ct. at 1115.
148. Id. at 234, 100 S. Ct. at 1118.
149. 463 U.S. 646, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
150. In securities law, a "tippee" is a "person who acquires material nonpublic information from
another who enjoys a fiduciary relationship with the company to which such information pertains."
Black's Law Dictionary 1484 (6th ed. 1990). A tippee has neither a fiduciary nor a quasi-fiduciary
relationship with the corporation or its shareholders.
151. In re Dirks, 47 S.E.C. 1401, 1441 (1981) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
230 n.12, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1115 n.12 (1980)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the public at
large."' 152 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 1
3
The Court extended the common-law rule of disclosure adopted in Chiarella
to tippees. By the Court's own admission, however, the application of the
Chiarella rule to tippees created "analytical difficulties."'-" In particular, under
what circumstances, if any, do tippees "inherit" the insider's duty to disclose?'55
The SEC proposed that the Court adopt a "disclose-or-refrain-from-trading" rule
applicable to tippees. Under the SEC's proposal, "anyone who knowingly receives
nonpublic material information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose
before trading.""'  This rule, the Commission contended, was the logical
extension of Chiarella.
The Supreme Court rejected the SEC's argument for the same reason it
previously had declined to impose a general duty of disclosure in Chiarella. The
SEC's position in both Chiarella and Dirks was falsely "rooted in the idea that the
antifraud provisions [of the federal securities acts) require equal information among
all traders."'5 7 The Court stated this "radical" parity-of-information rule is not
supported by congressional intent. Rather, because the disclose-or-refrain-from-
trading rule is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has preexisting legal
obligations. These obligations arise "from the relationship between the parties...
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in
the market."" 8
Nevertheless, the Court recognized the general prohibitions of the 1934 Act
impose a ban on at least some tippee trading," 9 If insiders are prohibited from
using undisclosed, insider information for their advantage, then they are likewise
forbidden to benefit from that information by giving it to an outsider. In some
circumstances, the Court explained, a tippee could serve as the conduit through
which an insider breaches his fiduciary duty. The Court concluded "some tippees
must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders not because they receive inside
information, but rather because it has been made available to them improper-
ly."'6 The test for determining whether such a disclosure is improper is "whether
152. Dirks v. SEC. 681 F.2d 824, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
153. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 652, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3260 (1983).
154. Id. at 655, 103 S. Ci. at 3261.
155. The court draws a distinction between outsiders who become fiduciaries of corporate
stockholders by means of a confidential relationship with a corporation, such as lawyers, accountants,
and consultants, and tippets who have no independent fiduciary duty. The first owes an independent
duty to disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it. Id. at 656 n.14, 103 S. Ct. at
3262.n.14. The source of a tippee's dtty to disclose, however, is not as clear.
156. Id. at 656, 103 S. Ct. at 3262 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 657, 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
158. Id. at 657-58. 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
159. For example, Section 20(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1988). makes it "unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to do an act or thing which it would be unlawful for any such person to do
under the provisions of this chapter ... through or by means of any other person."
160. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3264 (1983).
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the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And
absent a breach by the insiders, there is not a derivative breach [by the tippee].''
Thus, the Court held that because Secrist had not disclosed inside information to
Dirks out of a desire for personal gain, Dirks inherited no duty of disclosure under
Section 10(b).
D. Analytical Inconsistency
The rationale utilized by the Court in Chiarella and Dirks is fundamentally
inconsistent with that employed in Ernst & Ernst, Santa Fe, and Aaron. In the
latter decisions, the Court restricted the scope of Section 10(b) by adhering to the
section's language, the statutory structure, and congressional intent. In Chiarella
and Dirks, on the other hand, where strict construction would have led to an
expansive reading of the section, the Court turned to common-law doctrines to limit
Section 10(b)'s reach. This inconsistency suggests the Court's decisions have
largely been result-driven. In short, since 1976, the Court has acted to narrow the
scope of the Section 10(b) action at the cost of analytical uniformity and, to an
extent, predictability.
The Court in Central Bank strongly reasserts strict construction as the norm in
interpreting Section 10(b), This suggests a willingness on the Court's part to
reexamine established Section 10(b) doctrines that are inconsistent with Central
Bank. In particular, following the Central Bank decision, Chiarella, Dirks, and
even the existence of the private 10(b) action itself are subject to attack.
IV. DOCTRINES SUBJECT TO ATTACK FOLLOWING CENTRAL BANK
Central Bank unequivocally asserts the primacy of the statute in the judicial
interpretation of the federal securities laws. By concluding "the text of the statute
controls our decision,"' 62 the Supreme Court rejected the use of common-law
principles as a means for expanding the securities laws. Central Bank strongly
suggests that other extrastatutory Section 10(b) doctrines are ripe for review. This
Part will consider two such doctrines to be reconsidered in the interest of analytical
uniformity and intellectual honesty.
A. Rethinking Insider Trading Under Section 10(b)
1. The Principle of Full Disclosure Underlying the Federal Securities Law
In Dirks and Chiarella, the Supreme Court looked to the common-law
definition of fraud to define insider trading under Section 10(b). In Chiarella,
161. Id. at 662. 103 S. Ci. at 3265.
162. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994).
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the Court held that in the absence of a duty to speak, there is no duty to disclose
inside information before trading upon it.163 In Dirks, the Court held a tippee
who receives material, nonpublic information from an insider inherits the
insider's duty to speak only when the insider stands to benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure.'6 These holdings suggest the common law of
insider trading governs despite the language, legislative intent, and statutory
structure of the 1934 Act.
In Chiarella, the majority refused to recognize a general duty to disclose
insider information under Section 10(b), observing "neither the Congress nor the
Commission has adopted a parity-of-information rule" applicable to the exchange
of securities. 6  The Court itself, however, has suggested the contrary. For
example, in Ernst & Ernst, the Court explained "[tihe Securities Act of 1933...
was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material informa-
tion."' 66 In Santa Fe, the Court acknowledged the "fundamental purpose of the
1934 Act" was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor."' 67 And in Chiarella, Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, noted
"[t]he antifraud provisions [of the 1934 Act] were designed in large measure 'to
assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or
advantages among investors."' ' 16s  Indeed, the goal of full disclosure in the
exchange of securities has been recognized by the Court as the fundamental
impetus behind Congress' enactment of the federal securities laws.' 69
163. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222. 235, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1118 (1980). See also
supra part IlI.CI.
164. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665-67. 103 S. Ci. 3255, 3267-68 (1983). See also supra part
III.C.2.
165. 445 U.S. at 233, 100 S. Ct. at 1117. See infra note 171, defining the "parity-of-
information" rule.
166. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1382 (1976). See also
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
167. Santa Fe I.ndus., Inc. v. Green. 430 U.S. 462, 477,97 S. Ct. 1292, 1302-03 (1977) (quoting
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128. 151, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1471 (1972) (quoting
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180. 186. 84 S. Ct. 275, 280 (1963))).
168. Chiarclta v. United States, 445 U.S. 222. 241, 100 S. Ct. 1108. 1121 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 229, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 91 (1975), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 321).
169. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975), the Court
described the origins of the federal securities laws:
During the early days of the New Deal, Congress enacted two landmark statutes regulating
securities. The 1933 Act was described as an Act "to provide fill and fair disclosure of
the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails,
and to prevent fraud in the sale thereof .... ' The 11934 Act) was described as an Act
"to provide for the regulation. of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets
operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable
and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets .. "
Id. at 727-28, 95 S. Ct. at 1921-22 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Later, in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988), Justice Blackmun stated clearly: "This Court
'repeatedly has described the "fundamental purpose" of the [19341 Act as implementing a
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Recognizing that full disclosure of insider information is an impracticality,
Congress has delegated to the courts the duty of implementing this legislative
goal in a manner consistent with the smooth operation of the securities markets.
Thus, the courts must determine where the balance of imperfection is going to
lie. However, without engaging in this difficult balancing process, the Supreme
Court in Chiarella and Dirks applied the more -straightforward common law of
insider trading, thereby narrowly construing the duty to disclose under Section
10(b). These decisions remain in derogation of the philosophy of full disclosure,
the structure of the 1934 Act, and the analytical framework established by the
Court in Ernst & Ernst and reaffirmed in Central Bank.
2. The Parity-of-hiforination Rule and hisider Trading
Common sense dictates the possession of material, nonpublic corporate
information by anyone engaged in the exchange of that corporation's securities
constitutes an "undue preference or advantage."'70 Chiarella and Dirks stand
in stark contrast to this proposition.
The Court asserted in Chiarella and Dirks that a general duty of disclosure
under Section 10(b) is unsupported by statutory language or legislative intent.
This assertion, however, is disingenuous. Even a cursory examination of
administrative and judicial decisions indicates a philosophy of full disclosure is
inherent in the 1934 Act. Indeed, had the Court in these cases adhered to the
interpretive method established in Ernst & Ernst (and now reaffirmed in Central
Bank) and turned, in the absence of controlling language, to a consideration of
congressional intent, it would have established a broader definition of insider
trading under Section 10(b) based on the parity-of-information rule.'
In Chiarella and Dirks, the Court relied on Cady, Roberts,'72 an SEC
administrative decision, as a basis for rejecting the parity-of-information rule.
The Court interpreted Cady, Roberts as indicative of the SEC's intent to
superimpose the common-law rules of disclosure on Section 10(b). Chief Justice
Burger, dissenting in Chiarella, suggested otherwise. He proposed that a closer
"philosophy offill disclosure."" Id. at 230, 108 S. Ct. at 983 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78, 97 S. Ct. 1292. 1303 (1977) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186, 84 S. Ct. 275, 280 (1963))) (emphasis added).
170. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 241. 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1121 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 229. 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 91 (1975). reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 321).
171. The parity-of-information rule holds "anyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly
receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without
incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." 445 U.S. at 231, 100 S. Ct. at 1116 (quoting Chiarella
v. United States, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978)) (emphasis added). This rule is not expressly
stated in the securities laws, but some courts have found it implicit in the broad-based remedial
purposes of the'securities laws. See supra part IV.A.. The parity-of-information rule and the
disclose-or-refrain-from-trading rule are one'in the same.
172. hi re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
19951 1037
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
reading of Cady, Roberts reveals no intent on the part of the SEC to adopt the
common law of insider trading.' 73 The Chief Justice argued the two criteria
relied upon by the SEC in Cady, Roberts to impose a duty of disclosure on
insiders 174 reveal no intent to predicate that duty on a preexisting duty to speak.
Indeed, Justice Burger stated, "both of these factors are present whenever a party
gains an informational advantage by unlawful means."'7 5  Thus, the Chief
Justice interpreted Cady, Roberts as adopting a disclose-or-refrain-from-trading
rule applicable to anyone who possesses material, nonpublic corporate informa-
tion. In support of his conclusion, Chief Justice Burger noted the SEC applied
the disclose-or-refrain-from-trading rule to tippees in a subsequent decision, Blyth
& Co.'
76
The Court's decisions in Chiarella and Dirks also largely ignored the
seminal case SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.' 77 In Texas Gulf, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit engaged in an in-depth analysis
of the legislative history of Section 10(b) and concluded "the securities laws
should be interpreted as an expansion of the common law both to effectuate the
broad remedial design of Congress . . . and to insure uniformity of enforce-
ment."'171 In Texas Gulf, the SEC brought suit against Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
("TGS") and thirteen individuals alleging violations of Section 10(b). The SEC
alleged the defendants, including some insiders, had purchased TGS stock on the
basis of material, nonpublic information. Relying on Cady, Roberts the court
remarked:
The essence of the Rule [lob-5] is that anyone who, trading for his own
account in the securities of a corporation has "access, directly or
indirectly, to the information to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may not take
"advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing," i.e., the investing public.'79
The Second Circuit held the insiders had violated Section 10(b) by trading
on the information. The court further held Section 10(b) "is also applicable to
one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an 'insider'
173. 445 U.S. at 241, 100 S. Ct. at 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
174. The two criteria are the following: "() ... access ... to inside information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone: and (2) the
unfairness inherent in trading on such information when it is inaccessible to those with whom one
is dealing." Id.
175. Id. at 241-42, 100 S. Ct. at 1121 (emphasis added).
176. 43 S.E.C. 1037 (1969). In Blyth & Co., the Commission concluded a tippee, who gained
confidential Treasury Department information from an employee of a Federal Reserve Bank and
traded thereupon, had violated Section 10(b) by improperly using insider information.
177. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub
nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976, 89 S. Ct. 1454 (1969).
178. Id. at 855 (footnote omitted).
179. Id. at 848 (quoting Cady; Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)) (emphasis added).
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within the meaning of [the 19341 Act."'80 Thus, those defendants who were
not insiders but who nevertheless possessed nonpublic, corporate information,
had violated Section 10(b) by failing to disclose their informational advantage
before trading upon it. Establishing a clear parity-of-information rule under
Section 10(b), the Second Circuit stated:
[Alnyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing
it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so,
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned
while such inside information remains undisclosed.'
The Court stated this conclusion was necessitated by "[tihe dominant
congressional purpose underlying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [which
is] to promote free and open securities markets and to protect the investing
public from suffering inequalities in trading"'8 2 and by the fundamental policy
supporting Section 10(b)-that "all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
have relatively equal access to material information."'"
Thus, in light of congressional intent, judicial interpretation, and administra-
tive policy, the Court's conclusion in Chiarella and Dirks that the parity-of-
information rule is unsupported is baseless. By enacting the securities laws,
Congress sought to insure an equitable, open, and public marketplace in
securities. The parity-of-information rule is consistent with this goal. Moreover,
the recognition of a rule of disclosure broader than that imposed by the common
law is consistent with the remedial purpose of the securities laws. By enacting
a comprehensive body of securities legislation, Congress sought to supplant the
common law, whose remedies had proven insufficient to govern a modem
securities market.
Had the Court in Chiarella and Dirks been true to the interpretive principles
it adopted in Ernst & Ernst and strictly limited its interpretation of Section 10(b)
to the section's language, the statutory framework, and congressional intent, it
would have reached the conclusion that anyone who trades on nonpublic,
corporate information without first disclosing that information does so in
180. Id. (quoting In re Cody, Roberts & Co.. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)). Section 16(b) of the
1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988), implicitly defines who may be considered an insider:
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reasons of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase or sale, or any sale and purchase...
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer ... or by the owner of any security of the
issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer ....
Id.
181. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 858.
183. Id at 848.
10391995]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
violation of Section 10(b). Instead, the court embraced the common law of fraud
and reached a less expansive conclusion.
B. Rethinking the Section 10(b) Private Cause of Action
In Central Bank; .the Supreme Court exhibited a willingness to overrule
"hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every circuit in the
federal system."It By holding Section 10(b) does not reach aiders and
abettors, the Court signaled the beginning of the end of implied remedies under
Section 10(b). Taken to its logical conclusion, the Court's rationale leaves little.
room for the continued recognition of the extrastatutory Section 10(b) private
action.
It is fundamentally inconsistent for the Court to espouse strict adherence to
the statutory language in interpreting the securities laws, while continuing to
acknowledge the private 10(b) action-an action which the Court itself has
recognized as a judicially created, extrastatutory right.' 5 Simply, there is no
statutory basis for civil liability under Section 10(b) and thus, under the rationale
of Central Bank, no basis for the Section 10(b) private action.' 86
1. Inplying Private Causes of Action Under Section 10(b): From
Kardon to Central Bank
The courts have relied on three separate bases for implying private causes
of action under the securities laws: (1) the tort law doctrine, (2) the enforcement
doctrine, and (3) the Cort v. Ash 1 7 criteria. Each of these rationales has, in
turn, been rejected by the Supreme Court. No extrastatutory basis for implying
the private Section 10(b) action currently exists.
In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 8 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania relied on Restatement of Torts, Section
286,89 to imply a private right of action under Section 10(b). Although other
sections of the 1934 Act expressly provided for private causes of action, "the
existence of other express remedies was insufficient to manifest an intent 'to
deny a remedy and to wipe out a liability which, normally, by virtue of basic
principles of tort law accompanies the doing of the prohibited act.""'  Thus,
184. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate of Denver, 114 S. CI. 1439, 1456 (1994)
(Stevens. J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1446 ("Congress did not create a private Section 10(b) cause of action and had no
occasion to provide guidance about the elements of the private liability scheme.").
186. For a discussion of the advent of civil liability under Section 10(b), see infra part IM.A.I.
187. 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975).
188. 69 F. Sttpp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
189. See supra note 74.




Kardon relied exclusively on tort principles to imply a private remedy under
Section 10(b).
Lower courts have applied this tort law rationale as a basis for implying
private causes of action under the securities laws,' 9' but the Supreme Court has
followed a different approach. In J.. Case Co. v. Borak 192 the Supreme Court
implied a private right of action under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act. Section
14(a)' 93 makes it unlawful for any person to obtain authorization for corporate
action by means of a fraudulent proxy solicitation. The Court reasoned
"[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to
Commission action"'94 and thus implied a private remedy under Section 14(a)
to effectuate that purpose. This enforcement rationale was subsequently
narrowed by the Court in Cori v. Ash.'9s In Ash, the Court failed to find an
implied private right of action under a federal election statute that imposed
criminal penalties on corporations that make political contributions under certain
circumstances.'9 Restricting the enforcement rationale of Borak, the Court
established a four-part test for determining whether to imply a private right of
action. 197
The tort law rationale of Kardon and the enforcement rationale of Borak and
Ash suffered from the same defect. They invited the courts to imply causes of
action "without any finding that Congress intended to confer such a reme-
dy.'?98 In the mid-1970's, the Court began to reject the idea of extrastatutory
judicial rulemaking and to favor a more traditional interpretive role.
Without expressly abrogating the implied private Section 10(b) action, the
Court has repudiated the tort law rationale of Kardon. In Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington,'99 the Court declined to recognize a private right of action under
Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act. The Court dismissed arguments favoring the
implication of such a cause of action based upon widely accepted tort principals
as "entirely misplaced." 2" It -reasoned the mere existence of a person, injured
by conduct Which is prohibited by statute, does not confer on that person a
private right of action against the violator. Rather, the Court explained the
191. E.g., Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (implying a private
remedy under the Commodity Exchange Act); Reemar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D.
Mass. 1949) (implying a private remedy tinder Section 7 of the 1934 Act).
192. 337 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct. 1555 (1964).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
194. 337 U.S. at 432, 84 S. Ct. at 1560.
195. 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976).
197. The Ash four-pan test asks "(1) whether the plaintiff is pan of a class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted: (2) whether there is any relevant legislative intent: (3) whether the
implication of a remedy is consistent with the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of an
action is traditionally relegated to state law." Fischel, supra note I, at 90.
198. Id. at 91.
199. 442 U.S. 560, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
200. Id. at 568. 99 S. Ct. at 2485.
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appropriate question for its consideration "is one of congressional intent, not one
of whether this Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme that
Congress enacted into law."' '2 Thus, the Court expressly repudiated the tort
law rationale for implying private causes. Nevertheless, in subsequent cases the
Court continued to acquiesce to the private Section 10(b) action, despite its
discredited origin.
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 2 the Court effectively
refuted the enforcement rationale of Borak and Ash by declining to imply a
private action to effectuate broad-based statutory goals. In Transamerica, the
Court proclaimed statutory construction is the exclusive basis for finding implied
remedies and not "the desirability of implying private rights of action in order
to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute."'O
Thus, Without demonstrated proof of congressional intent, the Court refused to
imply a private remedy under Section 201 of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940.2
Touche Ross and Transamerica left little room for the implication of private
causes of action under the securities acts without a finding of congressional
intent. Whatever latitude remained was effectively erased by Central Bank:
We reach the uncontroversial conclusion, accepted even by those
courts recognizing a Section 10(b) aiding and abetting cause of action,
that the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and
abet a Section 10(b) violation. Unlike those courts, however, we think
that conclusion resolved the case.05
Nevertheless, in Central Bank itself, the Court acknowledged the continued
existence of the private Section 10(b) action by stating "[t]his case concerns the
most familiar private cause of action: the one we have found to be implied by
Section 10(b), the general antifraud provision of the 1934 Act. 2 6
Following Central Bank, congressional intent, as determined by statutory
language and structure, is the touchstone of liability under Section 10(b).
Nevertheless, the courts continue to acquiesce to the private Section 10(b) action,
even though Congress never intended such an action to exist. Moreover, every
rationale used by the courts to imply private actions has been refuted by the
Supreme Court. The private Section 10(b) action is unsupported and should be
overturned. Congress, not the judiciary, must address the need-if any-for
further regulation of the securities markets.
201. Id. at 578, 99 S. Cc. at 2490.
202. 444 U.S. 11, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979).
203. Id. at 15, 100 S. Ct. at 245.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I-b-21 (1988).
205. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994)
(emphasis added).




Prior to 1976, judicial activism resulted in the expansion of the federal
securities laws. Under the general antifraud provision of the 1934 Act, Section
10(b), the courts implied an extrastatutory private cause of action and then
expanded the reach of that implied action to various secondary actors, including
aiders and abettors. These actions, however, found no support in the language
or history of the 1934 Act. Rather, they arose as a result of the courts' improper
incorporation of common-law doctrines into the securities laws.
In 1976, with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court began the
process of reversing the unwarranted expansion of Section 10(b). In Ernst &
Ernst and in a series of cases thereafter, the language of Section 10(b) was found
to be controlling, and the scope of the Section 10(b) action was thereby
narrowed. In the context of insider trading, however, the Court continued to rely
on common-law doctrines to define Section 10(b)'s proscriptive reach. This
inconsistency suggests the Court's decisions have been result-oriented, driven by
a philosophical desire to narrow the federal securities laws even at the cost of
analytical uniformity.
Central Bank, which abrogated the judicially implied Section 10(b) aiding
and abetting action, firmly reestablishes the primacy of the statute in the
interpretation of the federal securities laws. Following Central Bank, congressio-
nal intent, as determined by the language and structure of the 1934 Act, is the
clear touchstone of liability under Section 10(b). Accordingly, Section 10(b)
doctrines having extrastatutory bases are subject to attack.
In Chiarella'and Dirks, the Court defined insider trading under Section 10(b)
in common-law terms, premising liability for trading on material, nonpublic
information on a preexisting duty to speak. Congressional intent, however,
suggests this is too narrow of a definition of insider trading under Section 10(b).
Congress enacted the federal securities laws in response to the perceived
inadequacy of the common law to govern the modern securities markets. The
1934 Act was grounded in the belief that full disclosure in the post-issuance
exchange of securities is essential for a fair and equitable marketplace. A
definition of insider trading under Section 10(b)'should, therefore, comport with
the philosophy of full disclosure. Such a definition would include a general duty
to disclose insider information before trading on it applicable to anyone in
possession of such information, and not just to those having a preexisting duty
to speak.
Taken to its logical extreme, Central Bank's rationale calls into question the
continued existence of the private Section 10(b) action itself. Wholly a creation
of the judiciary, the private 10(b) action has no basis in statutory language or
congressional intent. Moreover, theories previously relied upon by the courts to
imply private causes of action under the federal securities laws have uniformly
been rejected by the Supreme Court. Although the Court continues to acquiesce
to private liability under Section 10(b), its continued existence is untenable in the
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absence of additional judicial justification or, more favorably, congressional
action.
In conclusion, the recognition of a general rule of disclosure under Section
10(b) and the abrogation of the judicially created Section 10(b) private action
would restore analytical uniformity to the interpretation of the federal securities
laws and reserve rulemaking for Congress.
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